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Abstract 
 
The Europe that was born from Plato's "care for the soul" can today no longer be recognized; it has 
been replaced by the self-management of the economic EU. How can we now come back to a Europe 
concerned about its soul, the others, and the world, reinventing itself as a new nation? Jan Patočka's 
thoughts on post-Europe can show us the way. 
Starting from some clarifications on the definitely European initial meaning that Patočka detects in 
Socrates' "care for the soul", the purpose of this article is to examine what in this European spirit can 
be saved in the post-European age, and to what extent a "European nation" can still make sense. This 
analysis leads us, building on the visionary texts written in the seventies by Patočka, to rethink the 
possibilities of a reformation of European reason, and a métanoïa of Post-Europe.   
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If one were to characterize Europe with the use of an organic metaphor, one might 
feel tempted to state that the soul of Europe is located in Greece, its heart is in the Czech 
Republic – the only country on the old continent that remained a democracy in 1938 – and 
its two lungs are in France and in Germany. I dreamt of Europe reverting to its ancient 
Greek roots: care for the soul, concern for the others and the world, universal, luminescent 
reason. I dreamt of a social-minded Europe that would have implemented its project of 
perpetual peace and united its states around liberty, responsibility, equal dignity of all hu-
man beings and solidarity of all its citizens. With Robert Schuman I thought: "Europe will 
not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete 
achievements which first create a de facto solidarity." (Schuman 1950) I thought that Europe 
would urgently require a cosmopolitan solidarity built on the rights of man and that the politi-
cal will to work out a European constitution could not but be based on such a solidarity, 
which "will have to be widened to encompass all citizens of the Union, so that, for example, 
Swedes and Portuguese will be ready to vouch for one another." (Habermas 2006, 87) 
Instead of that, nothing else is common to the European community as it has been 
built than a market economy, its currency and its finance. And, out of some incredible irony 
of History, Greece is the first country that was on the verge of leaving that monetary Eu-
rope. The economic Europe has been constructed regardless of the intellectual, cultural, 
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ethical and political Greek foundations of Europe. That Greece should be the first country 
to reject the economic Europe, like some graft that does not take, is actually quite under-
standable. After all, what is left in "common" in the so-called European "community"? 
The Europe that was born from Plato's care for the soul can no longer be recognized. 
The age of the post-Europe described by Jan Patočka is underway. Moving away from the 
line drawn by Schuman and Delors to wander, the Europe we longed for quickly vanished. 
Can the identity of Europe be content with an economy without oïkouménè? Can it remem-
ber Europa and come back to its first principles? Will we, who are Europeans from the old 
continent fallen down from our Greek cradle, manage to come to life again and reinvent 
démokratia? How can Europe be founded again? Under what conditions can an European 
"nation" arise? 
The care for the soul of the spiritual Europe has been replaced by the self-
management of the economic Europe. How can we now come back to the European "thing 
itself ", to a Europe concerned about its soul, the others and the world, reinventing itself as 
a new nation? The project of a European nation, both theoria and praxis, both a "regulative 
idea" (Husserl) and a practical construction arising out of a philosophy of action, has to be 
worked out at fresh expense. Jan Patočka's thoughts on post-Europe can show us the way. 
Thus, starting from some clarifications on the definitely European initial meaning 
Patocka detects in Socrates' "care for the soul" (I), our purpose is to examine what in this 
European spirit can be saved in the post-European age and to wonder to what extent a "Eu-
ropean nation" can still make sense (II). This analysis leads us, building on the visionary 
texts written in the seventies by our phenomenologist philosopher, to wonder why and how 
European reason can be reformed. Can we hope for a métanoïa of Post-Europe?   
 
1. European care for the soul 
  
In its Socratic meaning, the soul is what bears the inner determination of man. "The 
soul decides for itself and, to that end, it has a power of its own – the knowledge of truth 
and of the good." (Patočka 2017)1 
Caring for the soul is first healing a mind torn between two logoï, at worst a mind 
that contradicts itself without being aware of it, and consequently says nothing (ouden 
leigein), is meaningless. "Socrates' approach in his care for the soul is determined by this 
tendency to find out an inner trouble, signaled by a logical or linguistic antagonism and 
hidden by the hypertrophia and the sclerosis of an inconsistent self." (ibid.) Therefore, the 
                                                          
1 It is our own translation into English as for all texts by Patočka. 
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first step of the therapeutics is elenchtic -the refutation of the absence of problematicity in 
everything related to the things of the good. Moreover, the Socratic care for the soul starts 
with "tracing out the limit," with the famous Delphic gnôthi seauton, the "know thyself" 
showing humans their limit (know you are only humans don't go into hubris, don't pretend 
to be gods). Caring for the soul begins by drawing the limit between what humans know 
and what they do not know. 
 Only sophrôn humans know what they know and what they do not know. But is 
self-knowledge just possible? That is the whole subject – an aporia – of Plato's dialogue 
The Charmides and "Socrates has no theoretical certainty at all about the construction of 
self-knowledge. The problem European metaphysics has been constantly dealing with from 
Aristotle to the most recent thinkers is set out here for the first time." (ibid.) The Charmides 
deals with the very topical problem of the relationship between science (épistémè) and 
wisdom (sophrosunè), and we know all too well how our modern society wrongly tends to 
take the technician expert for a sage. 
 To Patočka, self-knowledge is a two-sided problem, one side "is inner concentra-
tion under the influence of the healing logos," the other is the humble knowledge humans 
should have of their personal limitation. The Socratic care for the soul then unfolds through 
two pedagogical forces, dialectics and irony. In L'Europe et après Patočka points out that 
with Democritus, and even more with Plato, the care for the soul works in a questioning 
frame of thought which takes the form of "accounting through reason" (logon didonaï) 
including "the certainty there will be no closure" – the endless movement of an "inquiring 
logos" constantly looking for foundations. (Patočka 2007, 104-105)2 Such a gaze into what 
is, wisely avoids hubris. It is built on "the renunciation to  any claim to hold the truth" on 
the being and "care for the soul compels humans to look for what is good, to start seeking 
out some evident clarity on everything they think, say and do." (ibid. 112) 
 That shows how strong the demand for responsibility is with this care for the soul. 
Only this conception, specific to the "open soul", can show humans they are not given be-
ings, "but beings who need to be borne." (ibid. 218) To the closed subjectivity, everything 
seems given in advance: humans, the Earth, living beings, objects, values, etc. However, 
what Greek history and philosophy have tried to understand is precisely the problematicity 
of the world of life – which, as far as it is concerned, is never given as a theme, as we have 
all known since Husserl.  Originally, Europe means "a gaze into what is", according to 
Patočka. However, twisting the meaning of it, Europe gradually made a bad use of its re-
                                                          
2 All the subsequent references to Patočka and quotations come from his last texts, from the beginning 
of the seventies to his death, are from the compendium L'Europe après l'Europe (Patočka 2007). 
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sponsibility, so to speak: Europe set itself "a demand for universal responsibility which 
explains to a certain extent that European mankind may have taken its form of life for that 
of the whole of mankind." (ibid., 235) Its tutelary presumption to want to account for the 
others as for itself, on all levels, political, theological, economic and scientific, made it lose 
its aura. (We will come back to that, supra II). 
For the time being, let us briefly recall the description Patočka gives of the three as-
pects of Plato's care for the soul3: 
 as an onto-cosmological project, care for the soul, as a driving principle, is a gaze 
into what is, extended to the whole being; 
 the second aspect has to do with the political project of a state refounded in spirit 
with  the soul as its  structure (The Republic); 
 care for the soul as self-knowledge, deepening the inner life of the soul, its 
relationship to the body and to intercorporeality  -the soul is here conceived as the 
structure of appearing.4 
The third aspect refers to the problem of The Charmides, as we have seen. But the 
problem of the European spirit is precisely that it no longer seems able to reach self-
knowledge: 
The curse of the European spirit (…) is that, full of itself, it is unable to understand 
the others and consequently does not know itself either. It has found out a host of effi-
cient means to become the master of the world, but all have also been used – as we 
now see after the fall of Europe – for the purpose of self-destruction. Europe as a heg-
emonic power no longer exists. (Patočka 1990, 211) 
Once the diagnosis is made, and even before considering whether there is a possible 
therapy, what are the reasons for the disease the European spirit suffers from? 
 
2. From the European spirit to a post-European nation 
 
To Patočka, the specificity of European spirituality is the will to found the gaze into 
what is, on the one, the universal and the inner and social knowledge of the human soul. Its 
historic failure lies in the outer path of its hegemonic conquest and its imperialistic aspira-
tion. From now on Europe must take the inner path opening up to "the becoming-world of 
the world of life." (Patočka 2007, 40-44) The European spirit first aimed at irenic universal 
reason; it distorted this aim and turned it into a warlike, arrogant, and intrusive exportation 
                                                          
3See especially the paragraphs 9 to 12 in Patočka 2007. 
4 "The soul is not only the fact that there is the being but also that the being appears, that there is a 
specific, constant and irreducible structure of its manifestation." (ibid., 129) 
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of its universalism. This exportation was carried out violently: through colonialism, through 
its unilateral political vision of democracy (its mono-democratism), through its ultraliberal 
economic expansion imposing overconsumption as a way of life, through its "technoscien-
ticism" and through its neglect of classical "humanities". Patočka describes this phenome-
non clearly: "the spiritual dissolution" of Europe was achieved by the development of tech-
nosciences, "the decadent culture of subjectivism", the decline of "languages and the clas-
sics which were the spiritual cement of any Europeanity." (ibid., 46-47)  
The 17th century rationalism and science have gradually replaced metaphysics and 
religion. Eventually, their ambition to determine the whole Real and to subdue nature grad-
ually imposed the Gestell gaze. Science as "a domineering form of knowledge which wants 
to include the whole of nature in its theory only appeared in Europe." (ibid., 227) In spite of 
the historical conflicts that opposed science and religion, "the spirit of European Christian-
ism was to subject nature to men's practice by a new rationality at the service of one's fel-
low human being." (ibid., 228-229) 
But then, what can enable the European spirit to revert to its original will ? If the 
care  for the soul makes sense within the community, and if Plato's analogy between the 
soul and the community has limits of its own, the problem identified by Plato still remains  
and must be revived in seeking for "the specific meaning of the new community in  com-
bining intellectual distance and courageous commitment." (ibid.) In other words, the Euro-
pean spirit can only find itself again and be vivified through the alliance between 
sôphrosunê and andreia. 
For instance, can we be wise and courageous enough to conceive a European "na-
tion"? To speak of a European "nation" in the sense of a common identity would require 
that a majority of the inhabitants of Europe "feel" European. A president of Europe and a 
passport (for lack of a "European identity card") would be necessary but not even sufficient. 
Only a real community of the activities of the mind, that is to say culture and education, 
could give European peoples a national identity. "The spirit, as it advances towards its 
realization, towards self-satisfaction and self-knowledge, is the sole motive force behind all 
the deeds and aspirations of the nation. Religion, knowledge, the arts and the destinies and 
events of history are all aspects of its evolution. This, and not the natural influences at work 
upon it (as the derivation of the word natio from nasci might suggest) determines the na-
tion's character" (Hegel 1975, 56). 
In this age of deterritorialized flows, the notion of a European "nation" would imply 
conventional and ideal borders rather than natural and national ones. A European people 
can only exist through an activity of the mind giving it its singularity. This spiritual activity 
is made up of the Greco-Roman heritage, the legacy of Judaism through Christianism and 
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Islam, the humanist values of the Enlightenment and the democratic model with its values 
of liberty, equality, solidarity and secularism (laïcité). 
Admittedly, some geographic limits can be devised for Europe: the Atlantic border in 
the west, the icy Arctic Ocean with Iceland in the north, the Ural River in the East – since 
orienting Europe is giving it some Orient of its own – and the Mediterranean Sea in the south, 
with cousins – Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Turkey- connecting with European institutions 
as associated countries. But European borders cannot be internal, that is "interiorized". There 
can only be borders for (European) interiority if they are idealized.5 
Without that condition, "national borders would not be capable of securing (or trying 
to secure) identities, would not be capable of marking the threshold at which life and death are 
played out (in what in Europe is called 'patriotism')" (Balibar 2002, 94). Does the very idea of 
European patriotism (a non-economic one) make sense? Is it even to be desired? It is possible 
to conceive a nation without a homeland, whose unity is nevertheless secured by European 
defense and a European army. Habermas warns us: "The solidarity of citizens is shifted onto 
the more abstract foundation of a 'constitutional patriotism'. If it fails, then the collective col-
lapses into subcultures that seal themselves off from one another." (Habermas 2001, 74) 
What could a European "nation" be? 
The European nation cannot be an international economic alliance, as is the present 
European Union, which citizens not only fail to appropriate but denigrate, being only sensitive 
to its harmful effects and remaining blind to the benefits it brings them regionally. The eco-
nomic union confused the origin of Europe and its end: under the pressure of globalisation, it 
took for the beginning what could be a finality. "It is for us... to put some flesh on the Com-
munity's bones and, dare I suggest, give it a little more soul (…) You cannot fall in love with 
the single market." (Delors 1989) 
The European nation cannot either be an empire, in the sense of a post-national sover-
eign state, which annexes old nations in the context of Europeanism or under the pretext of 
universalism. Nor should it be an unprecedented capitalistic financial empire, and certainly 
not a patchwork of old Nation-States closed in on their particularism and their nationalism as 
in the 19th century. Its unity cannot be reduced to the sum total of its inward-looking parts. 
Instead, the European nation could be a federation of the United States (or united re-
gions) of Europe, whose citizens would at last share the sense of a common cultural identity – 
the one that recognizes differences in cultures-, with a conclusive territory whose borders 
                                                          
5 This decisive wording dates back to Fichte's Addresses to the German Nation (1807) as put it 
Etienne Balibar (Balibar  2002, 94). 
LABYRINTH Vol. 19, No. 1, Autumn 2017 
 
 
162 
 
would be redefined and with common foreign and defence policies. Then the main task of 
the European nation would decidedly be to wipe out misery on its own soil: 
A day will come when bullets and bombshells will be replaced by votes, by the uni-
versal suffrage of nations, by the venerable arbitration of a great Sovereign Senate, 
which will be to Europe ...what the Legislative assembly is to France... it is the object 
to which I shall always direct myself – the extinction of misery at home, and the ex-
tinction of war abroad. (Hugo 1849, 11) 
We are still very far from the aim Victor Hugo called for. Let us come back to what, ac-
cording to Jan Patočka, would enable the spirit of present Europe -that is our Post-Europe- 
to come to itself. 
 
3. Can we hope for a metanoïa of Post-Europe? 
 
Is there any chance for Europe to return to itself? Such is the essential question 
raised by Patočka, who already in 1970 perceived that Europe would have to discuss "with 
the cultural traditions that gave the European idea a necessary factual basis. These tradi-
tions have so far been considered as dead and meaningless, but we will have to learn to take 
them seriously." (Patočka 1990, 212) Europe can only be revived by transforming itself 
through otherness. To this end, it must give up the all-embracing, even totalitarian pretense 
of its rationality: 
If Europe, as Husserl thought, means rationality, if rationality is synonymous with 
universality, there was a contradiction in claiming and keeping rationality as the ex-
clusive property of Europe. The end of Europe may have a positive meaning. Europe-
an rationality, which is unifying, may launch a bridge which will make it necessary to 
take seriously and think without preconceived ideas what is exactly furthest from us. 
(Patočka 2007, 212-214) 
The Czech philosopher considers this salutary possibility with caution. Is Europe 
ready to open itself to multiethnic rationality? Patočka points out that Husserl's Krisis has 
already mentioned "the urgent task of deepening the foundation of European rationality, 
which is the only way to make it possible to have a genuine discussion with all the living 
traditions of the world of life in concreto." (ibid.) This deepening of European reason im-
plies going out of subjectivism and its tendency to become absolute, in order to find the 
way to transcendental intersubjectivity. Its historical spirituality cannot be reduced to scien-
tific and technical rationalisation: "as soon as it is extended to the reason expressing itself 
in ethical life, poetry, art, and religion, there is no reason why traditions quite different from 
our European one could not be allied to rational motives." (ibid., 210) Indeed, there are 
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forms of logic, modalities of human reason different from those we practice in Europe: we 
have to understand how they express themselves in non-European traditions in order to 
deepen the dialogism between them and us. Europe's task is to build such a bridge unifying 
modes of rationality: 
The European believes mankind is one because he identifies Europe with mankind; he 
easily forgets that, so far, there is no unitary mankind; there are only different sets of 
mankind waiting for some unifying formative action. (Patočka 2007, 59) 
Let us examine the case of democratic reason. Democracy is not the privilege of Eu-
rope and can never be only reduced to majority-rule ballot. Democracy is also and above all 
"the exercise of public reason" (Rawls 1999, 579-580) based on deliberation and the partic-
ipation of citizens in the decisions concerning their public affairs. In that sense, there is a 
grand tradition of public debate in India, China, Japan, Iran, Turkey and in a lot of Arab and 
African countries. 
To recognize that democratic reason at work in other cultures through going out of 
its unilateral, ethnocentric democratism has become a compelling necessity for Europe. 
That is an essential task for Europe in order to give a new life to its care for the other and 
return to the care for the soul without losing its own soul. To crystallize the recognition of a 
political globalisation of democratic history, to reform itself and take eastern democratic 
centres seriously, to symbolize the synergy between different cultural forms of democratic 
reason, such is the task of Europe. 
Jan Patočka's questioning is a topical matter of urgency: "Is it certain", he wonders, 
"that non-European liberation movements are fundamentally identical to the struggle of 
underprivileged classes in Europe?" (Patočka 2007, 243) Isn't that another Europeanistic 
view? For more than forty years, Patočka has been warning us that the different spirituali-
ties of non-European cultures may conflict with our hyper-rationalistic conception, which 
imposes its sole worldview: that is a form of Polemos for now and for the years to come. 
Thus, only a refoundation of rationality can save Post-Europe: reviving its funda-
mental spiritual principle, the care for the soul. Life in the idea must contend with ideology 
and the open soul must contend with subjectivism enclosed on itself. Reason must conquer 
human understanding. The spirit of distanciation and critical review must be applied to our 
spiritual tradition without any Eurocentrism or expansionist rationality. "The spirit in this 
post-European context", Karel Novotný comments, "is that of the solidarity of the shaken," 
(Novotný 2012, 149)6 inasmuch as it constantly rekindles problematicity, the shaking up 
(thaumazein) of the certainty of the already there, of the given. Everybody in quest of life in 
                                                          
6 The translation is ours. 
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truth can share this renewed mode of the gaze into what is. What Patočka aims at is to give 
a transcendental foundation to a transcultural spirituality, which could unite humans in 
solidarity with one another in a new form of Socratism, careful of the problematicity of the 
world. This spirit is open to what the other can make me discover in myself with his foreign 
spirituality and to what my spirit can unveil in himself. 
*** 
Such a task requires a heroism of the logos, a métanoia, a new Socratic heresy, an 
unprecedented choice (haïrê): to substitute the cosmopolitanism of spiritual Europe for the 
imperialism of economic Europe (constituting Europeanity through cosmopolitanism and 
not the opposite)7, and to substitute the universality of democratic reason for the imperial-
ism of technoscientific rationalisation. The aim of Post-Europe must set itself is to move 
from rationalisation back to reason, to make sure, as Patočka puts it, that human "under-
standing may recover itself in reason." (Patočka 2007, 53) 
European reflexion, prompted by the limitations of its technoscientific ratio, is des-
tined to "fertilize extra-European reflexion." (Patočka 2007, 241) It should set itself as telos 
a new spiritual conversion of its reason (métanoia) in place of its cult of rationality. 
Europe has no monopoly on the question of problematicity. The problematicity of 
what is, the shaking up (thauma) of the given meaning, the liberty to deny the non-
problematic evidence of the world are present in  a great many other cultures and find their 
equivalent in age-long Taoist, Buddhist, or Indian traditions. The only way for Europe to 
reform itself is to open itself to these other forms of problematicity. From now on, this is 
the sole condition to build a common language and a common world.8 
"The waking have one common world, but the sleeping turn aside each into a world 
of his own,"9 as Heraclitus put it. 
 
Translated in English by François Monnanteuil 
 
 
Dr. Philippe Merlier, Académie de Limoges, philippe.merlier[at]ac-limoges.fr 
 
                                                          
7I developed this idea in chapter III: "L'Europe de Patočka" of my book Patočka, le soin de l'âme et 
l'Europe (see Merlier 2009, 151-210). 
8"Today, at a time when all the sets of mankind are becoming one, we have beforehand neither a 
common world nor a common language and the main task awaiting us will precisely be to create 
both" (Patočka 2007, 243). 
9Heraclitus: Fragment LXXXIX, according to Plutarch (see Burnet 1920, 140). 
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